NPT Review Conference Begins Amid Growing Political Divisions and Declining Trust in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Introduction
The upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), scheduled to start on April 27 at the United Nations in New York, will take place at a time of increased tensions among nuclear-armed states and growing doubts about the treaty's effectiveness. Past conferences have failed to produce a final agreement, and current political conditions suggest a similar outcome is possible.
Main Body
The NPT, which has been signed by almost all countries except Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, is based on a simple agreement: non-nuclear states give up the right to develop weapons, while nuclear-armed states promise to reduce their own arsenals and allow access to peaceful nuclear technology. The upcoming meeting follows two previous review conferences in 2015 and 2022 that ended without a final political statement. The 2015 meeting failed because of opposition to a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the 2022 meeting broke down due to disagreements over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Ukraine. According to Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, there is a shared feeling of crisis among the member states. The expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia means there are no longer any bilateral arms control agreements between the world's two largest nuclear powers. All nuclear-armed states are increasing their nuclear capabilities, reversing the progress made after the Cold War. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the nine nuclear-armed states had 12,121 warheads as of January 2025, with the US and Russia holding nearly 90% of the total. Both countries are carrying out major modernization programs, and China has rapidly expanded its arsenal. France has announced an increase in its nuclear weapons, and US President Donald Trump has stated his intention to conduct new nuclear tests. A major point of disagreement is Iran's nuclear program. Iran, which is a member of the NPT, claims its activities are peaceful, but information revealed in the early 2000s about undeclared nuclear work raised suspicions that it was trying to build weapons. The US has demanded a 20-year ban on uranium enrichment and the export of Iran's stockpiles. Some critics argue that this demand goes against the NPT's guarantee of the right to peaceful nuclear energy. One possible solution is to strengthen the NPT by introducing universal, strict inspection systems similar to those used in the Chemical Weapons Convention, which would apply to all non-nuclear states. This would allow Iran to keep its enrichment rights while accepting stronger verification. Additionally, the US could show a renewed commitment to disarmament, a process that has seen an 80% reduction in arsenals since the Cold War, although this trend has now been reversed by modernization policies. The conference makes decisions by consensus, which increases the chance of a third failure in a row. Potential problems include the war in Ukraine, Iran's nuclear program and the conflict there, North Korea's growing arsenal, and fears among non-nuclear states about the spread of weapons. The conference secretary-general, Christopher King, noted that while the treaty might not collapse immediately, it could fall apart over time. Seth Sheldon from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) expressed doubt about a positive outcome, saying that trust is being lost both inside and outside the NPT. The role of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control is also becoming a topic, with some states calling for human control to be maintained.
Conclusion
The NPT review conference faces major challenges, with geopolitical rivalries and a lack of progress on disarmament weakening the treaty's basic agreement. Without a final consensus statement, the long-term future of the non-proliferation system could be further damaged, although the treaty itself remains the main legal tool for nuclear order.